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MALPICA-ORSINI: BYPASSING THE UNWED
FATHER IN NEW YORK ADOPTIONS
Recently, the New York Court of Appeals, in Malpica-Orsini v.
Blasi,1 upheld the constitutionality of a New York adoption statute
allowing illegitimate children to be adopted without their father's
consent. This comment will assess the court's decision in light of
Stanley v. Illinois2 and other relevant Supreme Court decisions. Pertinent cases in other jurisdictions will be examined, as will the prior
development of parental rights in the New York courts.
Appellant Hector Orsini and Corrine Caberti, although unmarried, lived together as husband and wife from February 1969 until
June 1972. Their daughter was born in November of 1970. Mr.
Orsini's name was listed on the child's birth certificate and he was
the subject of a court order of filiation and support in September 1972.
He voluntarily bore the expenses of the child's birth and upbringing
prior to the order, and it appears that he subsequently complied with
the order's support provisions (although there were some inconclusive
allegations that he was in default on these payments).
The couple separated in June 1972, but Mr. Orsini continued his
support payments and continued to visit the child. In January 1973, the
mother moved to a new address. She thereafter refused to accept the
support payments and refused to allow Mr. Orsini to visit his daughter.
In February 1973, Ms. Caberti married another man, who subsequently
petitioned to adopt the child. The family court approved his request.
Orsini, the natural father, appealed the family court's judgment, but
the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the decision to grant the
adoption. It should be emphasized that Mr. Orsini was not seeking to
obtain custody of his child. He merely sought to block the adoption
so that he might maintain his legal status as the child's father.
Under the provisions of section 111 of the New York Domestic
Relations Law, the consent of the mother of a child born out of wedlock is required for the adoption of that child.3 There is no similar
1. 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975), appeal dismissed,
96 S. Ct. 765 (1976). It is unclear whether the dismissal means that the Court has
shifted away from the right enunciated in Stanley, or if it felt that Mr. Orsini's position was not analogous, or if it thought that procedural due process had been provided
and that the state's interest was sufficient to overcome Mr. Orsini's claim.
2. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
3. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 111 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
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requirement that consent be given by the child's father. Mr. Orsini
contended that this provision was violative of the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. ,
In its opinion, the New York Court of Appeals stated that
adoption is a purely statutory creation which enjoys a strong presumption of constitutionality. In deciding the equal protection issue,
the court, citing Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,4 declared that
it need not be bound by the outcome-determinative "straitjacket of
the two-tier approach with its 'tired formulations' and 'stock responses' "-5 in its consideration of the constitutional character of the
interests involved. The court concluded that the New York system,
while admittedly giving unwed fathers fewer rights to their children
than unwed mothers or married parents, is reasonable and justified
by a compelling state interest in the welfare of children. In assessing
the state's interest, the court stated that if the consent of fathers of
illegitimate children were required, "the worthy process of adoption
would be severely impeded," and it "would have the overall effect
of denying homes to the homeless and of depriving innocent children
of the other blessings of adoption. ' 7 The court anticipated "[g]reat
difficulty and expense ... in locating the putative father to ascertain

his willingness to consent."' 8 It feared "that the grant to unwed fathers
of the right to veto adoptions would provide a very fertile field for
extortion" by fathers seeking revenge or attempting to recoup support
expenses.
The court also concluded that there was no denial of due process,
since Mr. Orsini was given notice and the opportunity to raise objections at the adoption hearing which was to determine the best
interests of the child. It declared that this hearing was sufficient to
meet the constitutional standards enunciated in Stanley v. Illinois.
I.

STANLEY V. ILLINOIS AND SUBSTANTIVE

DuE

PROCESS

Mr. Stanley was an unwed father who, like Mr. Orsini in the

instant case, had always played a normal parental role, living with and
caring for his children. Stanley's children were taken from him and
4.

406 U.S. 164 (1972).

5. 36 N.Y.2d at 578, 331 N.E.2d at 493, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
6. Id. at 572, 331 N.E.2d at 489, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
7.
8.

Id.
Id.

9. Id. at 573, 331 N.E.2d at 490, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
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made wards of the state upon the death of their mother, in accordance with an Illinois dependency statute which did not include unwed
fathers in the definition of "parent." This statute had the effect of
depriving such fathers of their children by classifying motherless illegitimate children as "parentless" and, therefore, "dependent" wards
of the state who could be put up for adoption without any hearing as
to the fitness of the father. In contrast, all other parents could be deprived of their children only after a neglect proceeding in which
parental unfitness was proved.
The positions of Mr. Orsini and Mr. Stanley were analogous.
Both men sought to have their status as fathers legally preserved, and
both were confronted by statutes which refused to recognize their biological and psychological ties with their children solely because no
ceremonial marriage had been performed.'
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Illinois court,
which had upheld the statute. Seven justices heard and decided the
case; five justices found that due process had been violated, and four
of them maintained that there also had been a denial of equal protection. Because a majority of the justices concurred in only the due
process holdings of Stanley, this Comment will deal primarily with that
aspect of the case.
There are two related due process principles which arise from
Stanley-substantive and procedural. The Court found that "Stanley's
interest in retaining custody of his children is cognizable and substantial."" It declared that only a very substantial state concern would
justify interference with that right and found that a state interest in
protecting minor children would be sufficient to overcome this substantive parental right only when the facts of the particular case, elicited in a proper hearing, prove that the parent in question is actually unfit.12 The state could not make decisions on the basis of ques-

tionable general presumptions 13 concerning the disinterest or unfitness
10. Of course, when Mr. Stanley finally won his case, he was entitled to the
physical custody of his children, since he was their sole surviving parent. Mr. Orsini,
by contrast, would probably not be able to prevail over his child's mother in a custody
contest. Nevertheless, he still had a strong interest in preventing another man from
becoming his daughter's legal father. By retaining his parental status, he could be sure
of visitation rights and would probably be entitled to actual custody if the child's
mother were to die or become unfit. Thus, although the immediate consequences differed,
protection of the same fundamental legal right was sought in both cases.
11. 405 U.S. at 652.

12.
13.

Id.
Id. at 654-55.
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of most unwed fathers, even though that might be a more convenient
way to proceed. 14 Accordingly, the Court ordered that a hearing must
be held to examine the unfitness issue on an individualized basis.Y5
Thus, Stanley stands for the proposition that a father who has maintained an ongoing family relationship' 6 with his chilren may not be
denied his status as a parent 7 without proof that he is unfit.' 8 The fact
that Mr. Stanley had not gone through a ceremonial marriage was
dearly held not to be dispositive of his right to his children. The Court
declared that the right of a man to the children he has sired and raised
warrants deference, whether or not such children are legitimate. 1
The use of the due process clause as a vehicle not only for setting
procedural standards, but also for protecting fundamental substantive
rights emanating from the Constitution, has had a varied history. Its
invocation to protect property rights and to limit economic regulation,
epitomized in Lochner v. New York,20 flourished during the late 19th
and early 20th centuries, only to be completely discarded in the Depression era. Recently, however, substantive due process has reemerged
as a tool for safeguarding personal liberty, and the Supreme Court has
often employed it in ways that are consistent with the proposition
here that parental rights are constitutionally protected. In Meyer v.
14.

Id. at 656.

15.

Id. at 658.

16.

Stanley seems to place emphasis on the fact that the father had actually

lived with and raised his children. This point recurs in other cases which have expanded upon Stanley and has been underscored by various commentators. See Collyer,
Due Process for the Unwed Father, 46 FLA. B.J. 508 (1972); Note, Stanley v. Illinois:
The "Legitimate Birth" of the Out-of-Wedlock Father's Right to be Heard at Custody
Proceedings, 2 CAPITAL L. REv. 149 (1973); Note, Stanley v. Illinois: Expanding the
Rights of the Unwed Father, 34 U. PITT. L. RFv. 303 (1973); Note, The "Strange
Boundaries" of Stanley: Providing Notice of Adoption to the Unknown Putative Father,
59 VA. L. Rav. 517 (1973).
17. It must be emphasized that although a father's legal status may not lightly be
severed, this does not bar the courts from granting actual custody to the child's mother,
from regulating the father's visitation rights, or from determining support obligations.
See Reeves, Protecting the Putative Father's Rights After Stanley v. Illinois: Problems
in Implementation, 13 J. FAMmY L. 115 (1973-74).
18. In support of the principle that parental status is a substantive right which
can be severed only upon a showing of unfitness, see Hession, Adoptions After "Stanley"
-,Rights for Fathers of Illegitimate Children, 61 ILL. B.J. 350 (1973);
Schwartz, Rights
of a Father With Regard to His Illegitimate Child, 36 OHio ST. L.J. 1 (1975); Note,
Stanley v. Illinois: The "Legitimate Birth" of the Out-of-Wedlock Father's Rights
to be Heard at Custody Proceedings, supra note 16; Note, Stanley v. Illinois: Expanding the Rights of the Unwed Father,supra note 16; Note, The "Strange Boundaries"
of Stanley: Providing Notice of Adoption to the Unknown Putative Father, supra note
16; Comment, The Emerging Constitutional Protection of the Putative Father's
ParentalRights, 70 Mlcs. L. REv. 1581 (1972).
19. 405 U.S. at 651.

20.

198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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Nebraska,2' for example, the Court stated that the concept of liberty
encompassed "not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the
right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a
home and bring up children

....

,,2 Five years later, in Pierce v.

Society of Sisters,23 there was an acknowledgement of "[t]he liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control," and a realization that "the child is not the
mere creature of the State." 24 Skinner v. Oklahoma declared that "[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental" and among "the basic civil
rights of man." 25 In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court stated that "this
primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now
established beyond debate .... 2-16
The concept of the "natural rights" of unwed parents recurred,
after Stanley, in the Supreme Court cases of Levy v. Louisiana27 and
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,28 which tended to equalize the
constitutional protections accorded biological and legal families. These
cases were decided on equal protection grounds, but are relevant to
this analysis because they demonstrate the Court's continuing commitment to protect the substantive rights of all families, whether or not
there has been a legal marriage. In Levy, illegitimate children were
found to have enjoyed the same family relationship with their mother
as if they were legitimate. 29 These children were held to have the same
right to bring an action to recover for the mother's wrongful death as
would legitimate children. The Weber Court said very much the same
thing about an unwed father.
II.

RIGHTS OF UNWED FATHERS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

In assessing how Stanley should have been applied to the MalpicaOrsini case, it would be useful to consider how several other jurisdictions have interpreted Stanley in similar situations. In Rothstein v.
21.

262 U.S. 390 (1923).

22. Id. at 399.
23. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
24. Id. at 534-35.

25.

26.
27.
28.
29.
at 72.

316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
391 U.S. 68 (1968).
406 U.S. 164 (1972).
"[T]hey were indeed hers in the biological and in the spiritual sense." 391 U.S.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

Lutheran Social Services,30 the Supreme Court vacated and remanded,
in light of Stanley, a Wisconsin Supreme Court decision holding the
state's adoption statute (which gave the unwed mother the sole power
to consent to the adoption of her child) constitutional. Upon remand,
the Wisconsin court held that the statute unconstitutionally denied
the rights of unwed fathers and that the consent of both father and
mother would thereafter be necessary. 31 On the same day, the Supreme
Court remanded Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan,3 2 in which the Appellate
Court of Illinois had denied an unwed father custody of his children
under a paternity act which stated that fathers of children born out of
wedlock had no right to custody or control of their children, except as
might be granted in adoption proceedings. Upon reconsidering the
case, the Illinois court decided that fathers could no longer be considered ineligible for custody. Since he was fit and was able to provide a good home, the defendant-father was allowed to keep his children, in preference to their mother. 33 In a similar case, People ex rel.
Slawek v. Covenant Children'sHome,34 the Supreme Court of Illinois,
relying on Stanley for the proposition that the interests of fathers of
illegitimate children are no different than those of other parents, held
that adoption statutes precluding such fathers from asserting their
rights to their children are unconstitutional. In the case of E. v. T., 35 the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, rejected a statute
which gave mothers of illegitimate children an exclusive right to custody and control. The court stated that distinctions affecting the substantial rights of a child or its natural parents, based upon the illegitimate status of the child, are violative of due process according to Stanley. Yet another statute permitting the adoption of children born out of
wedlock upon the consent of the natural mother alone was tested in
Oregon. In the case of Miller v. Miller,30 the United States court of appeals, citing Stanley as its sole authority, held the statute to be constitutionally null and void. Finally, in Hammack v. Wise,3 7 the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia, also citing Stanley, held that unwed
fathers are entitled to enjoy the benefits of the well-established prin30.
Services,
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

405 U.S. 1051 (1972), vacating and remanding Rothstein v. Lutheran Social
47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970).
59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826 (1973).
126 Ill. App. 2d 410, 262 N.E.2d 717, vacated, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan, 9 Ill. App. 3d 260, 292 N.E.2d 145 (1972).
52 I1. 2d 20, 284 N.E.2d 291 (1972).
124 N.J. Super. 535, 308 A.2d 41 (1973).
504 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1974).
211 S.E.2d 118, 121 (W. Va. 1975).

MALPICA-ORSINI

1976]

ciple of law that a parent is entitled to the custody of his child unless
there is clear and convincing proof that he is unfit. Finding no such
proof of unfitness, the court awarded custody of the child to its father
over the competing claim of its maternal grandmother.
III. ASSESSING MALPICA-ORSINI IN LIGHT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

There appear to be several aspects of Malpica-Orsini which do
not comport with Stanley and which make the decision constitutionally suspect. First, Mr. Orsini's substantive right to be recognized as
the legal father of his child was abridged. The New York court maintained that it had satisfied the mandate of Stanley by granting the
father a hearing.3 8 However, the only purpose of this hearing was to
decide whether the proposed adoption was in the best interests of the
child-not to determine whether Mr. Orsini was unfit. The court did
not recognize the key principle that absent a finding of his unfitness,
a natural father is entitled to full parental rights.
Several New York cases, which do not seem to have been considered in the Malpica-Orsini decision, will now be surveyed briefly.
These cases, and many others, demonstrate that New York has long
regarded parental rights to children (whether or not such parents are
married) as fundamental and meriting the greatest deference from
the courts. They have held that only when a parent is proved to be
manifestly unfit, or has indisputably renounced his parental role, may
his children be adopted without his consent. In the case In re Ella B,3 9
the court of appeals declared that a parent's right to care for and
control his child is fundamental. People ex rel. Scarpetta v. SpenceChapin Adoption Service emphasized "the primacy of status thus accorded the natural parent," 40 and many cases have held that "[t]he
mother or father has a right to the care and custody of a child, superior
to that of all others, unless he or she has abandoned that right or is
proved unfit ....

41 There has never been any declaration that these

rules of law do not apply to unwed fathers. To the contrary, People
38.

36 N.Y.2d 568, 577-78, 331 N.E.2d 486, 492, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511, 520 (1975).

39. 30 N.Y.2d 352, 285 N.E.2d 288, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1972).
40. 28 N.Y.2d 185, 193, 269 N.E.2d 787, 791, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65, 71 (1971).
41. People ex rel. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 10 N.Y.2d 332, 179 N.E.2d 200,
222 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1961); People ex rel. Kropp v. Shepsky, 305 N.Y. 465, 113 N.E.2d
801, 122 N.Y.S.2d (1953); People ex rel. Portnoy v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539, 104

N.E.2d 895, 111 N.Y.S.2d -

(1952).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

ex rel. Meredith v. Meredith42 held that while a mother has a right to
custody of her illegitimate child superior to that of the father, the
father has a right superior to any stranger's.
Situations similar to Malpica-Orsinihave occurred frequently in
New York adoption cases in which a divorced mother remarries and
her new husband wishes to adopt the child. In such cases, the New
York courts uniformly have held that the adoption cannot take place
without the natural father's consent, unless he has abandoned the child
or been deprived of his civil rights, is insane, incompetent, retarded or
a drunkard, or has been deprived of custody because of cruelty or
neglect. 43 A recent case in this area is W. v. G.44 There, the New York

Court of Appeals found that even though a natural father had only
maintained infrequent contacts with his children after the divorce and
had not regularly met his support obligations, he had still evinced
sufficient involvement with the children to defeat the contention that
he had abandoned them. Abandonment was held to require a settled
intent to be rid of all parental obligations and to forego all parental
rights. Mere inadequacy of a parent would not be sufficient. Thus, it
was held that Mr. "G's" children could not be adopted by his former
wife's new husband without Mr. "G's" consent.
In view of Stanley's enhancement of the rights of unwed fathers,
the New York courts should apply the principles mentioned above to
adoption cases involving such unwed fathers. They, too, ought to be
entitled to block adoptions of their children unless their behavior
shows an unmistakable renunciation of the parental role or serious
unfitness.
The Malpica-Orsini holding may also be violative of due process
in its use of presumptions. Stanley held that even though it was possible that most unmarried fathers might be unfit, the state could not
employ this as an irrebuttable presumption applicable to all unwed
fathers. 45 Nevertheless, the New York court utilized such presumptions.
It flatly refused to even consider the possibility that Mr. Orsini might
himself be a fit and appropriate father, ruling that it would be concerned only with "[g]eneral conditions rather than the special circumstances of a sympathetic and idiosyncratic situation." 4
42. 272 App. Div. 79, 69 N.Y.S. 462 (2d Dep't), afJ'd, 297 N.Y. 692, 77
N.E.2d 8, 79 N.Y.S.2d (1947).
43. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 111 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
44. 34 N.Y.2d 76, 312 N.E.2d 171, 356 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1974).
45. 405 U.S. at 657, 658.
46. 36 N.Y.2d at 578, 331 N.E.2d at 493, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
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Akin to this is the constitutional issue of overbreadth. It is well
established that even legitimate state goals must be implemented by
means that place the least possible burden on constitutionally protected activities. 47 Fundamental personal liberties cannot be broadly
stifled when the end can be more narrowly achieved. 48 It is apparent
that New York could have adopted a statutory scheme which would
have guarded against the evils it feared without totally abrogating the
fundamental rights of a sizable class of parents.
IV.

SOME PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN PROTECTING
THE RIGHTS OF UNWED FATHERS

The New York Court of Appeals, in upholding the state's adoption
statute, was greatly influenced by certain practical and administrative
considerations. It feared that (1) if the consent of unwed fathers were
required, the difficulties of location, proof, and securing their approval
would make the system unworkably slow and costly; (2) such fathers
would, in the main, be unfit, uninterested, or inclined to manipulate
their consent in order to profit from extortion schemes or to seek revenge; and (3) consequently, prospective adoptive parents, fearing
harassment by the natural parent, or lengthy legal entanglements,
would be loathe to embark upon the adoption process. However, various procedural adjustments can easily attenuate these objections.
Although Stanley requires the consent of natural fathers, unless
dispensed with in accordance with proper legal standards and procedures, 4 9 this does not mean that an impossibly slow or burdensome
system must result. The Court, in Stanley, specifically stated that unwed fathers could have their rights foreclosed if they did not respond
to proper notice of the adoption proceeding. 50 Furthermore, it may
be expected that fathers who feel any concern or involvement with
their children will take the initiative in coming forward, as did Mr.
Stanley and Mr. Orsini. Thus, the question of notice will probably
not present significant problems.
As to the problem of obtaining the father's consent, it has been
seen that New York already has a statutory system for dispensing with
47. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
48. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 18 (1966).
49. See Collyer, supra note 16; Hession, supra note 18; Reeves, supra note 17;
Comment, The Emerging Constitutional Protection of the Putative Father's Parental
Rights, supra note 18.
50. 405 U.S. at 657 n.9.
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the requirement of parental consent in adoptions where the parents
are uninterested, absent or unfit.51 Constitutional mandates could best
be implemented by applying these laws to putative fathers just as they
are currently applied to divorced parents and unwed mothers. This
would do much to dispel the court's fear of unworthy fathers irresponsibly abusing their rights. If these statutes were applied to unwed
fathers, those fathers who had lived with and cared for their children
would be protected, and the consent of the unfit would not be needed.
In regard to the concern about extortion, the law already provides
that "[n]either the notice of a proposed adoption nor any process in
such proceeding shall be required to contain the name of the person
or persons seeking to adopt the child. ' 52 Thus, although the father
would enjoy a hearing on his substantive rights, he could not know
who would adopt the child if his rights were terminated. It is true
that a father might, out of a desire for revenge, withhold his consent
for no valid reason, but he would gain little, since he would have no
right to the custody of the child unless he were willing and able to
provide a better home than the mother. It would therefore seem that
only those fathers who truly wanted to maintain a continuing relationship with their children would bother going through the formalities and inconvenience of objecting to an adoption.
It is true that requiring the putative father's consent would increase administrative inconvenience and expense. Nevertheless, "[t]he
Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency." 53
Also, the New York court's conclusion that the introduction of a few
additional technicalities and uncertainties would dampen the enthusiasm of prospective adoptive parents is doubtful. In an era when
black market babies are fetching many thousands of dollars, one may
imagine that not many couples will be so easily turned aside.
51. N.Y. Doss. REL. LAW § III (McKinney Supp. 1976); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw
§§ 371, 384 (McKinney Supp. 1976). For details as to what constitutes abandonment,
see cases cited note 41 supra. See generally Gordon, Terminal Placements of Children
and Permanent Termination of Parental Rights: The New York Permanent Neglect
Statute, 46 ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 215 (1971); Comment, The Unfit Parent: Conditions
Under Which a Child May Be Adopted Without the Consent of His Parent, 39 U. DT.
L.J. 347 (1962); Note, Child Abandonment: The Botched Beginning of the Adoption
Process, 60 YALE L.J. 1240 (1951). Furthermore, consent is not required of a parent

who has left his child in the care of an institution or foster home and has then failed
to maintain contact with the child. N.Y.
1976).
52.
53.

FAMILY

CT. ACT § 611 (McKinney Supp.

N.Y. Doms. REL. LAw § 111 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
405 'U.S. at 656.
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CONCLUSION.

It should be stressed that honoring the rights of worthy unwed
fathers may yield positive benefits to their children. In those cases
where the mother is absent, the child would be able to enjoy the care
of its natural parent. The child would also avoid the possible stigma,
rootlessness and insecurity which could arise from being adopted.
Stanley v. Illinois tells us that an unwed father, like his married
counterpart, enjoys a substantive, constitutionally protected right to
his legal status as parent of his child. This right may not be terminated
by action of law unless he is found to be unfit after having had a
reasonable opportunity to be heard at a judicial proceeding. New
York's adoption law, which ignores this right and allows the child to
be relinquished by its mother alone, would appear, to that extent, to
be unconstitutional. Adequate means exist or could be devised to
screen out unfit fathers, and there is no reason to suppose that the
adoption process will be more than slightly delayed by extending to
all fathers their basic rights. Twelve states have already extended such
rights to unwed fathers, 54 and the Uniform Adoption Act also suggests
that the consent of a putative father should be required for any
adoption if his paternity has been established through acknowledgment or court proceedings. 55 New York can and should reform its law.
JOSEPH

54.

Reeves, supra note 17.

55.

UNIFORM ADOPTION ACT § 5(a) (2).

K. Rio-ro

